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Introducing Private-Property
Rights to Cuba: How Cuba’s New
Constitution Paves the Way for
Economic Growth
Renee Monzon*
On February 24, 2019, Cuba adopted a new Constitution. 1 The new
Constitution formally recognizes private-property ownership. From the
beginning of Socialism’s impact on Cuba, private-property ownership
had been legally abolished until Fidel Castro stepped down from power
in 2008. 2 This new Constitution shows a departure from the socialist
grasp on the economy. Cuba likely recognizes that private-property
ownership is fundamental to economic growth in capitalist countries
and now seeks to benefit from the growth that accompanies a system of
private-property rights. Cuba is not the first socialist country to embark
on a process of property privatization. This paper will look at how postcommunist countries have implemented property rights in the past and
apply the prevailing economic theories to the process Cuba is going
through now.
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1

See Geoff Thale & Teresa García Castro, Cuba’s New Constitution,
Explained, WASH. OFFICE OF LATIN AM. (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.wola.org/analysis/cubas-new-constitution-explained/
[https://perma.cc/EY4Q-VCDC].

2.

See Carmen Sesin, Cuba After Castro: How Much Change, How Quickly,
NBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fidelcastrosdeath/cuba-after-castro-how-much-change-how-quickly-n688681
[https://perma.cc/76XM-XDLE] (stating when Fidel Castro stepped
down from power); MARK P. SULLIVAN, CUBA: U.S. POLICY IN THE 116TH
CONGRESS
6
(2019),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45657
[https://perma.cc/E8FS-ZSXP] (noting a new provision in Cuba’s
Constitution is the reintroduction of private property rights).
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Introduction
Cuba has embarked on a process of partial privatization in an
attempt to reinvigorate an economy that suffers from some of the
highest levels of inequality and lowest rates of growth in the world.3
Cuba’s recognition of private-property rights shows a departure from
the previous ownership system established under Fidel Castro’s
communist regime. Their attempts to create an economic market that
3.

See Nora Gámez Torres, Cuba Is A Lot Poorer Than The Government
Reports, A New Study Shows, MIAMI HERALD (Jan, 22, 2018),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/cuba/article195681589.html
[https://perma.cc/F42F-QNH3].
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welcomes private-property ownership indicates a trend towards
capitalist economic policies. While not an impossible transition, this
privatization process is fraught with dangers, as exemplified by other
countries who have gone through similar patterns on the road to postsocialist economic growth.
Several decades ago, a handful of countries pursued the Communist
ideals laid out by Marx and Engels. 4 While utopian communism was
never perfectly achieved, most of these countries devolved into socialist
systems. 5 Socialist countries strive towards social ownership over the
means of production, which often means consolidation of property in
the state’s hands. 6 This communal ownership, however, often leads to
depletion of resources and economic decline. 7 When socialist countries
realize these problems, they often turn to policies that tend to produce
growth in capitalist economies. 8 Property rights are central to most
modern economic systems and are a key feature of the capitalist
economy. 9 In abandoning socialist economic structures established
during communist rule, the recognition of property rights and
privatization of state-owned assets are some of the first reforms
implemented. 10 And now, Cuba is experimenting with this same process
of instituting capitalist economic theories and private-property rights
in a socialist economy. This paper will analyze patterns and theories
about the intersection of private-property rights and economic growth
and apply them to Cuba’s unique circumstances.
First, this paper will look at the history of Cuba, particularly how
their political and economic systems have evolved over its time as a
sovereign nation. Cuba is a geographically small country with a deep,
4.

See David Floyd, What’s the Difference between Communism and
(Feb.
11,
2019),
Socialism?,
INVESTOPEDIA
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100214/what-differencebetween-communism-and-socialism.asp [https://perma.cc/ADX7-SPC6].

5.

See id.

6.

See id.

7.

ONLINE,
See
Lack
of
Property
Rights,
ECONOMICS
https://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Market_failures/Lack_of_property
_rights.html [https://perma.cc/WV39-BWQQ].

8.

See, e.g., Paul R. Gregory, Why Socialism Fails, HOOVER INST. (Jan. 10,
2018),
https://www.hoover.org/research/why-socialism-fails
[https://perma.cc/A3GU-FZDJ].

9.

See Sean Ross, How are Capitalism and Private Property Related?,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040615/how-are-capitalismand-private-property-related.asp [https://perma.cc/H6XB-4XZC] (last
updated June 25, 2019).

10.

See E.S. Savas, Privatization in Post-Socialist Countries, 52 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 573, 573 (1992).
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complicated history. An ally of the Soviet Union during the Cold War,11
Cuba retained its communist system long after the fall of Communism
in much of the world. 12 Their communist roots played a vital role in
the shaping of their current socialist system. And learning how Cuba’s
current economic system formed is essential for understanding how
theories of privatization and economic growth will apply to its unique
circumstances.
The second section of this paper will discuss the most recent change
in Cuba’s political atmosphere: the adoption of a new Constitution. In
June of 2018, Cuba took a bold step forward. The National Assembly
put together a committee to draft a new Constitution. 13 Amongst the
many changes made in the proposed constitution, it recognized private
property as a form of ownership. 14 This first draft also reaffirmed the
socialist system but diminished its references to communist ideals. 15 The
proposed Constitution then went through a period of public comment
and revisions. 16 After some notable changes, the Constitution was
adopted by national referendum in February of 2019. 17
The changes found in this new Constitution fall in line with the
evolution that property rights have undergone in Cuba over the last
several decades. And the third section of this paper will look at this
development of property rights in Cuba. For decades, private-property
ownership was a foreign concept in Cuba. All means of production were
11.

History
of
Cuba,
THE
NATIONS
ONLINE,
https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/History/Cuba-history.htm
[https://perma.cc/U7PV-BUUS] [hereinafter History of Cuba].

12.

See id.

13.

See Guillermo Nova, Cuba’s Legislature Approves Constitutional
TIMES
(July
23,
2018),
Reforms,
HAVANA
https://havanatimes.org/features/cubas-legislature-approvesconstitutional-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/49XY-EJGZ].

14.

Communist-run Cuba to Recognize Private Property in New Constitution,
REUTERS (July 14, 2018, 6:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uscuba-politics/communist-run-cuba-to-recognize-private-property-in-newconstitution-idUSKBN1K4108 [https://perma.cc/S9QT-NVZ6].

15.

See Andrés Oppenheimer, Cuba’s New Constitution is Worse Than the
(Aug.
11,
2018,
5:57
PM),
Old
One,
MIAMI HERALD
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/andresoppenheimer/article216527420.html [https://perma.cc/LCR5-EQSL].

16.

See Sarah Marsh & Nelson Acosta, Cuban Lawmakers Approve New
Constitution Which Heads to Referendum, REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2018, 5:00
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-constitution/cubanlawmakers-approvenew-constitution-which-heads-to-referendumidUSKCN1OL0OF [https://perma.cc/8FNT-7JK5].

17.

See Andrea Rodriguez, Amid Crisis, Cuba Plans Revamp of State and
PRESS
(Mar.
14,
2019),
Legal
System,
ASSOCIATED
https://www.apnews.com/ee5ea44978d544cf8720abd11a99b99d
[https://perma.cc/3YAT-2H82].
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owned by the state. 18 We first saw this regime deteriorate when Cuba
started allowing for certain forms of property ownership in 2011. 19 The
National Assembly enacted a statute that allowed for Cuban citizens
to own homes. 20 Even though the government heavily regulates this
ownership, it created a housing market in Cuba, an economic sector
that never had a reason to exist before. 21 When Cuba’s new
Constitution and its recognition of private property is viewed in the
context of its evolving rights and markets, we can best analyze avenues
for future economic growth in Cuba.
While Cuba remains reluctant to admit any trends away from a
socialist economy and towards Capitalism, some recognized forms of
ownership in the new Constitution parallel Western understandings of
property rights. 22 The fourth section of this paper will first look at
traditional definitions of property rights in capitalist countries.
Recognition and legal protection of private-property rights is essential
to capitalist economies. 23 This section will then look at the types of
property ownership recognized under the new Cuban Constitution. The
ownership forms Cuba recognized deviate from socialist conceptions of
property ownership and create fodder that could lead to economic
growth.
Cuba is not the first country to use privatization as a means to
achieve economic growth in a system crippled by failed Communism.24
The fifth section of this paper will look into theories of economic growth
and patterns that have arisen from other post-communist countries who
went through this same transition. Theories on what set of
circumstances leads to the best growth extend to the speed of
transition, types of reforms, social atmosphere, and legal framework.
18.

See William N. Trumbull, The Cuban Economy, COLLEGE OF
CHARLESTON (Aug. 10, 2017), http://cubaonthehorizon.cofc.edu/thecuban-economy/ [https://perma.cc/6SE4-QLNF].

19.

See Damien Cave, Cuba to Allow Buying and Selling of Property, with
TIMES
(Nov.
3,
2011),
Few
Restrictions,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/world/americas/cubans-can-buyand-sell-property-government-says.html [https://perma.cc/U923-LQGL].

20.

See id.; Decreto-Ley 288, GACETA OFICIAL, G.O. Ext. No. 35, at 359 (Oct.
28, 2011), available at http://cafefuerte.com/documentos/1308documentos-decreto-ley-288-y-resoluciones-para-la-compraventa-decasas-en-cuba/ [https://perma.cc/V66H-BR5J].

21.

See Philip Peters, Cuba’s New Real Estate Market, THE BROOKINGS INST.,
at 1–2 (Feb. 2014), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Phil-Peters-Cubas-New-Real-EstateMarket.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3QD-XF46].

22.

See Thale & Castro, supra note 1.

23.

See Ross, supra note 9.

24.

See generally Savas, supra note 10.
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While the best source for analyzing post-communist economic reform
comes from the countries that emerged after the Soviet Republic
collapsed, Cuba’s circumstances are fundamentally unique. This paper
will also analyze property-ownership theories specific to Latin America.
Countries in Latin America are subject to a unique mix of conditions
that change how property rights and capitalist economic policies are
applied. 25 Cuba is making significant shifts in their economy, but they
are not attempting to build a new political and economic system from
scratch. While post-Soviet countries provide relevant guidance,
recommendations for Cuba must arise out of a blend of post-communist
theories and Latin American experiences.
The last section of this paper will then apply relevant theories
about the intersection of private-property rights and economic growth
to Cuba’s unique circumstances. While the changes Cuba has made are
significant, the government will have to continue to create a stronger
economic system and legal framework to support private property
rights if they want to see consistent economic growth. The manner in
which reforms are currently being implemented are neither decreasing
wealth inequality nor increasing lower-class purchasing power. On this
trajectory, Cuba risks the formation of a plutocracy instead of the
middle-class growth they were seeking. This section will provide further
recommendations and guidance for the Cuban government for how to
best utilize private-property rights for economic growth. Ultimately,
Cuba’s best option for achieving economic growth will require them to
modify their legal and political frameworks to accompany this new
constitutional recognition of private-property rights.

I.

BRIEF HISTORY OF CUBA

Cuba’s known history dates back to the Spanish colonization of the
island in the fifteenth century, but Cuba ultimately gained formal
independence in 1902. 26 Since then, Cuba has undergone several
revolutions and regime changes. 27 Even after Cuba ceased being an
American protectorate, the United States retained a great amount of
control over Cuba. 28 Cuba began to come into its own during the
revolution in 1933, when Fulgencio Batista became the face of Cuban
leadership and politics. 29 Through several communist puppet-presidents

25.

See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).

26.

History of Cuba, supra note 11.

27.

See generally id.

28.

Id.

29.

Id.
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and a presidential term of his own, Batista controlled Cuban politics. 30
The 1940 Constitution sought to enforce radical progressive ideals, such
as the right to labor and healthcare. 31 From 1944 to 1952, the opposing
political party in Cuba gained control of the presidency. 32 During this
time, Cuba saw economic growth, an influx of foreign investment, and
an increased standard of living. 33 Batista returned to Cuba in 1952,
regaining control of the country through a military coup. 34 He remained
in control of the Cuban government until 1958. 35 During that time,
Batista revoked many political liberties and outlawed the Cuban
Communist Party. 36
Becoming unsettled with the corrupt political system, Fidel Castro
spearheaded another Cuban Revolution starting in 1956.37 Castro
officially assumed the position of Prime Minister in 1959. 38 The United
States initially supported Castro’s efforts, viewing it as an opportunity
for democracy to take hold in Latin America. 39 However, when Castro
legalized the Communist Party, summarily executed leaders of the old
regime, and expropriated American property in Cuba, tensions quickly
rose and the United States retaliated with economic sanctions against
Cuba. 40 During the Cold War, Cuba aligned itself with the Soviet

30.

Id.

31.

See CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1940) (Cuba), translated
in I CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 610–11, 625 (Amos J. Peaslee ed. &
trans., 2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter 1940 Constitution].

32.

History of Cuba, supra note 11.

33.

Id.

34.

Id.

35.

BRITANNICA,
Fulgencio
Batista,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fulgencio-Batista
[https://perma.cc/XC7M-DP35].

36.

DANIEL JAMES, CUBA: THE FIRST SOVIET SATELLITE
(1961).

37.

Rebecca Sanchez, Elissa Curtis & Rachelle Klapheke, Remembering the
Cuban
Revolution,
MSNBC
(July
28,
2015),
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/remembering-fidel-castro-and-the-cubanrevolution#slide1 [https://perma.cc/G27W-JX7W].

38.

Id.

39.

Castro and Communism in Cuba, UNIV. OF GRONINGEN,
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/outlines/history-1963/america-in-the-modernworld/castro-and-communism-in-cuba.php
[https://perma.cc/4R4HYB3W].

40.

DEP’T
OF
STATE,
Cuba
Sanctions,
U.S.
https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/
[https://perma.cc/59CJ6TBB].
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Union, providing troops in return for economic support. 41 After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba went through a period of intense
economic hardship, but began to recover after aligning itself with
countries like Venezuela. 42 Despite these changes, Cuba remained a
communist regime, controlled by the Communist Party in a “one party
– one state” system. 43
Serving as prime minister, president, and leader of the Communist
Party, Fidel Castro retained his position of power until he stepped
down in 2008. 44 He appointed his brother, Raúl Castro, to serve as
President and head of the Communist Party. 45 When Raúl Castro took
office, he promised greater freedoms and fewer restrictions. 46 While not
fulfilling all of his promises, Cuba did undergo several changes during
his tenure as President. 47 Raúl Castro increased access for tourism,
opened channels for investment and trade, improved relations with
other countries and international organizations, and worked with
President Obama to mend the divide between the U.S. and Cuba. 48
Though Raúl Castro still serves as the leader of the Communist Party,
he stepped down from his role as president and Miguel Diaz-Canel was
elected in 2018. 49
41.

Berta Esperanza Hernández Truyol, Out in Left Field: Cuba’s Post-Cold
War Strikeout, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 15 (1994) (discussing how the
Soviet Union provided Cuba with economic support); Jorge I. Dominguez,
U.S.–Cuban Relations: From the Cold War to the Colder War, 39 J. OF
INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS 49 (1997) (discussing how
Cuba and the Soviet Union were allied in deploying troops).

42.

Mimi Whitefield, Cuba is Slowly Losing a Lifeline as Venezuela Collapses,
(Oct.
3,
2019),
https://www.latimes.com/worldL.A. TIMES
nation/story/2019-10-03/venezuela-meltdown-us-sanctions-batter-cuba
[https://perma.cc/FBR9-EZDZ].

43.

History of Cuba, supra note 11.

44.

Phil McCausland, Former Cuban Leader Fidel Castro Dead at 90, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fidel-castrosdeath/former-cuban-president-fidel-castro-dead-90-cuban-tv-n688511
[https://perma.cc/NVW5-CABF].

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44822, CUBA: U.S. POLICY
CONGRESS (2019).

48.

Id.; Lauren Duffy & Carol Kline, Complexities of Tourism Planning and
Development in Cuba, TAYLOR AND FRANCIS GROUP (Mar. 25, 2018),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21568316.2018.1440830
[https://perma.cc/XZ7S-8VDP]; Daniel P. Erikson, Raul Castro,
BRITANNICA,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Raul-Castro
[https://perma.cc/K5L4-R9M8].

49.

Patrick Oppmann & Alanne Orjoux, Miguel Diaz-Canel Named Cuba’s
New
President,
CNN
(Apr.
20,
2018),
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Over the years, Cuba has had various different constitutions, the
most recent one being enacted in 1976. 50 This Constitution, taking
effect during Fidel Castro’s reign, continually emphasizes a system
guided by the communist principles of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. 51 To
this day, the Communist Party remains the seat of power in the Cuban
political system, and the head of the party—the First Secretary—serves
as the de facto leader of Cuba. 52
Since Fidel Castro’s death, Cuba has seen the largest expansion of
political and economic freedoms in decades. While these changes are far
from dramatic, they do indicate Cuba’s willingness to enter the modern
international political system and drift away from the communist
ideologies that controlled their society in the past.

II.

CUBA’S NEW CONSTITUTION

Cuba’s most notable and recent political activity was the adoption
of a new Constitution. In June of 2018, a constitutional commission
proposed a new Constitution that would bring a variety of changes to
the island country. 53 The draft of the constitution was approved by the
National Assembly in July of 2018. 54
The draft constitution’s proposed changes ranged from property
rights to political structure to personal freedoms. 55 Under the draft
constitution, marriage was defined as a relationship between “two
people” instead of between a man and a woman. 56 The draft added the
presumption of innocence in criminal cases and the right to habeas

https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/19/americas/cuba-new-presidentnamed/index.html [https://perma.cc/WW62-YEJH].
50.

See generally CUBA’S CONSTITUTION OF 1976 WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH
2002, translated by Pam Falk, Milagros M. Gavilan, & Anna I. Vellve
Torras, Oxford University Press (July 27, 2018), available at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002.pdf?lang=e
n [https://perma.cc/2YGV-6UWY].

51.

Id. at 7.

52.

Sesin, supra note 2; Raul Castro to Lead Cuba’s Communist Party until
2021,
FRANCE
24
(Apr.
19,
2018),
https://amp.france24.com/en/20180419-raul-castro-leadership-cubacommunist-party-2021-diaz-canel [https://perma.cc/74VS-4ZTZ].

53.

See generally Marc Frank, Cuba’s proposed new constitution: what will
change, REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/uscuba-constitution-explainer/cubas-proposed-new-constitution-what-willchange-idUSKBN1KY1UC [https://perma.cc/37PX-EDYN].

54.

Nova, supra note 13.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.
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corpus. 57 Additionally, it provided that people could sue the state for
damages and negligence. 58 Under political reforms, it added the role of
an appointed prime minister to manage the day-to-day affairs of the
government. 59 Additionally, the draft provided that a new set of
governors will replace the Communist Party first secretaries as the
highest official in Cuba’s 15 provinces. 60 The tone of the Constitution
also shifted. The draft did not reference past goals of reaching “utopian
communism.” 61 The only references to Communism were in the
continued establishment of the Communist Party as the only legal
political party and its irrevocable role in guiding the nation. 62 Instead,
the draft constitution continually established Socialism as the political
and social system of Cuba. 63
The proposed Constitution also laid out a series of economic
reforms. The text of the draft Constitution established an economy
based on “socialist ownership,” 64 but some elements of the draft actually
showed a trend away from socialist policies. For the first time, the
proposed Constitution recognized the market as a fact of economic life, 65
though the language allowed the government to retain ultimate control
over the market and countermand it at will. 66 Additionally, private
businesses and non-farm cooperatives were designated as legitimate
economic activity, and the role of foreign investment was upgraded
from secondary to “important” or “fundamental.” 67
Most importantly, the proposed constitution recognized private
property as a form of ownership in Cuba. 68 Article 21 of the draft
constitution lists and defines six types of property ownership under the

57.

Frank, supra note 53.

58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.

Rodriguez, supra note 17

61.

Frank, supra note 53.

62.

Id.

63.

See Proyecto de Constitución de la República de Cuba [Proposed
Constitution] Jul. 22, 2018 (Cuba), translated in BILL OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA (Maria del Carmen Gress,
trans., HeinOnline World Constitutions Illustrated Library 2018)
[hereinafter Proposed Constitution].

64.

Id. art. 20.

65.

Frank, supra note 53; see also Proposed Constitution, supra note 56, art.
20.

66.

Frank, supra note 53.

67.

Id.

68.

Proposed Constitution, supra note 63, art. 21.
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Economic Foundations section. 69 Even though this draft recognized
private property, it followed the definitions of property ownership with
a qualifier that the state encourages property ownership of a “more
social character,” 70 indicating the continued establishment of socialist
principles. Article 22 went onto establish that the state will regulate
ownership to guarantee that the concentration of ownership in nonstate persons “does not exist.” 71 So even though property rights are
being recognized, the government is attempting to retain strong control
over them.
After the National Assembly approved this draft, the proposed
constitution was open for a period of public comment from August 13
to November 15. 72 Over this three-month period, 7 million Cubans
gathered at over 100,000 locations to comment on the proposed
Constitution. 73 The hundreds of thousands of proposals and opinions
were presented to the constitutional commission for review. 74 Based on
these comments, the commission made 760 changes to the first draft of
the Constitution. 75
While the initial draft of the Constitution showed bold steps away
from Cuba’s communist roots, the revised version indicates that Cuba
took a step back towards their old ways. Notably, Cuba reinserted the
goal of “advancing towards a communist society” after its absence from
the first draft sparked public outcry, according to state-run media.76
The updated draft also restricted some social freedoms the first draft
provided for, removing the language that would have paved the way
for same-sex marriage and weakening the provisions that provided for

69.

Id.

70.

Id.

71.

Id. art. 22.

72.

National News Staff, A Constitution to Serve Cuba, GRANMA (July 23,
2018),
http://en.granma.cu/cuba/2018-07-23/a-constitution-to-servecuba [https://perma.cc/Q5VQ-UWVG].

73.

Mimi Whitefield, Cuba Asked For Public Feedback On A New
Constitution. Now It’s Deciding Which Suggestions to Include, MIAMI
HERALD (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/cuba/article221917690.html (last accessed March
17, 2019).

74.

Id.
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religious freedoms. 77 During the comment period, the government even
invited Cuban exiles to make suggestions for the Constitution draft.78
But the final version does not expand the role of private property or
the political rights of citizens residing outside the island, which were
two of the most popular demands among Cubans living abroad. 79
With regard to property rights, the constitutional commission
revised the section about the accumulation of property. 80 In the first
draft, the constitution banned the accumulation of property, stating
that it “does not exist.” 81 The revised Constitution simply stipulates
that the state must regulate the accumulation of property. 82 Most
importantly for this paper, the updated draft further restricted the
original definition of private property. The final document includes a
clarification to emphasize that private property only has “a
complementary role in the [planned socialist] economy.” 83 While there
were several other changes, these are the most relevant and important
for the analysis of Cuba’s future economic growth.
On December 22, 2018, the National Assembly approved the
updated text of the Constitution and released it to the public as the
77.

The Associated Press, Cuba Eliminates Language About Same-Sex
Marriage from Draft of New Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/world/americas/cuba-gaymarriage-constitution.html [perma.cc/9L9N-CN89]; Diana Chandler,
Cuba’s Proposed Constitution Cuts Religious Freedoms, BAPTIST PRESS
(Feb.18,
2019),
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[https://perma.cc/2X59-TYDH];
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[https://perma.cc/5CNU-7EW2].
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[https://perma.cc/4JJH-NN94].
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https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/cuba/article223980880.html
[https://perma.cc/7G3T-PDQS].

80.

Marsh & Acosta, supra note 16.

81.

Proposed Constitution, supra note 63, art. 22.

82.

Marsh & Acosta, supra note 16.

83.
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final version of the Constitution that would be voted on. 84 Cuba held a
national referendum for the Constitution on February 24, 2019. 85 The
following day, state-run media reported that the Cuban population
passed the new Constitution with a 78% approval rating. 86 In the wake
of the Constitution’s passage, Cuban legal experts expect that the
National Assembly will have to enact between 60 and 80 new laws over
the next two years to adapt to the changes the new Constitution
requires. 87 Meanwhile, Cuban citizens remain hopeful that this new
Constitution will bring big, positive changes to the political system and
state structure. 88

III.

Evolving Property Rights in Cuba

The Cuban population has not always suffered from the deprivation
of private-property rights. The 1940 Constitution, established under
Batista, protected property rights, providing that “[t]he Cuban Nation
recognizes the existence and legitimacy of private property in its
broadest concept as a social function and without other limitations than
those which, for reasons of public necessity or social interest, are
established by law.” 89 Under this regime, Cuban citizens enjoyed the
right to own and use property without government interference. 90 These
constitutional guarantees were acceptable under international law and
consistent with democratic legal principles of the time. 91
A.

Property Rights Under the Castro Regime

Cuba’s constitutional property rights began to deteriorate when
Fidel Castro seized control of the island at the beginning of 1959.92
Castro’s first attack on property rights occurred when he amended

84.

Marsh & Acosta, supra note 16.

85.

Id.

86.

Rodriguez, supra note 17. Though, this is a relatively low passage rate for
Cuba, with most other measures with passage rates over 90%. Id.

87.

Id.

88.

Id.

89.

1940 Constitution, supra note 31, at 626, art. 87.

90.

Jose A. Ortiz, The Illegal Expropriation of Property in Cuba: A Historical
and Legal Analysis of the Takings and a Survey of Restitution Schemes
for a Post-Socialist Cuba, 22 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 326–
27 (2000).

91.

Id. at 327.

92.

Id. at 328 (stating that though constitutional property rights were
deteriorated in the past, Castro initially reestablished them then promptly
returned them to a deteriorated state).
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Article 24 of the Constitution on government confiscation of property.93
The amended version allowed for discriminatory takings of property
and worked as a mechanism to punish all political opposition. 94
A month after assuming control, Castro officially repealed the 1940
Constitution and established the Fundamental Law. 95 Within the
following two years, the government nationalized nearly all private
property. 96 First, the Agrarian Reform Act converted all large
agricultural estates into state-owned farms. 97 And those who were
allowed to keep their land were severely restricted in the use and
transference of the property. 98 Second, the Castro Government further
amended Article 24 to expand the classes of persons that property could
be expropriated from. 99 Additionally, the amended text deprived
victims of any judicial procedure to challenge the expropriation and
removed the original guarantee of compensation for these government
takings. 100 Third, Castro enacted Law No. 851, which forcibly
expropriated all businesses United States citizens owned in Cuba.101
Fourth, Castro passed Law No. 890 in October of 1960, which
confiscated virtually all Cuban-owned businesses and nationalized all
Cuban-owned industries. 102
To solidify the goals of the communist revolution in Cuba, Castro’s
government enacted the Constitution of 1976. 103 Chapter I, Article 15
defined property under this Constitution, establishing that all property
is socialist state property, belonging to the entire people of Cuba.104
This Constitution placed almost all land and industry in the
government’s hands and removed all private-property ownership from
93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95.

Lina Forero-Nino, The Cuban Government Approves Guidelines to
Reform Cuba’s Economic Model and Develops an Implementation
Strategy, 17 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 761, 764 (2011).

96.

See Ortiz, supra note 90, at 328–32.

97.

Id. at 329.

98.

Id. at 330.

99.
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100. Id. at 331.
101. Id. at 332; Ley Numero 851 [Law No. 851], GACETA OFICIAL, Special Ed.,
No. 22 (July 31, 1960) (Cuba).
102. See Ortiz, supra note 90, at 322; Ley Numero 890 [Law No. 890], GACETA
OFICIAL, Special Ed., No. 25 (Oct. 31, 1960) (Cuba).
103. See Ortiz, supra note 90, at 322.
104. Constitución de la Republica de Cuba (1976), translated in V
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1 (Albert P. Blaustein
& Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1996) [hereinafter 1976 Constitution].
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the scope of constitutional protection. 105 This system remained in place
until Fidel Castro stepped down from power in 2008. 106 Over the past
decade, the Cuban government has begun to depart from the
communist ideals that justified Castro’s gross violations of property
rights.
B.

Legalization of Private Property by Statute

In one of Raul Castro’s most important market reforms of his
presidency, Cuba recognized private-property ownership for the first
time in decades. 107 In 2011, the National Assembly passed Decree-Law
288, allowing for citizens to legally transfer titles to their homes for the
first time since 1959. 108 Granted, this statute still restricts home
ownership and property transfers. 109 People are only allowed to own
two homes, one to live in and a vacation home. 110 Additionally, all sales
are subject to a government tax on the property sale. 111 Scholars
indicate that allowing the free trade of property is a huge step towards
Capitalism. 112 On the other hand, Cuban officials claim that this new
law still maintains Socialism by containing provisions that control both
speculation and concentration of wealth. 113 Nevertheless, with a housing

105. Ortiz, supra note 90, at 333.
106. Anthony Faiola, In Cuba, the Castro Era Ends this Week as Raúl Steps
POST
(Apr.
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2018),
Down
as
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/for-the-firsttime-in-six-decades-cuba-wont-be-led-by-a-castro/2018/04/17/f1df8b3c3e61-11e8-955b-7d2e19b79966_story.html
[https://perma.cc/4CZQL6E6].
107. Cuba Passes Law Allowing Private Home Sales, BBC NEWS (Nov. 3,
2011),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-15575632
[https://perma.cc/77TE-YULT].
108. Decreto-Ley 288, GACETA OFICIAL, G.O. Ext. No. 35, at 359 (Oct. 28,
2011), available at http://cafefuerte.com/documentos/1308-documentosdecreto-ley-288-y-resoluciones-para-la-compraventa-de-casas-en-cuba/
[https://perma.cc/3C8D-97Y4]; Damien Cave, Cuba to Allow Buying and
Selling of Property, With Few Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/world/americas/cubans-can-buyand-sell-property-government-says.html
[https://perma.cc/N5CU7HRF].
109. See Cave, supra note 108.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See generally Christopher Palomo, “Capitalist” Cuba: The Privatization
of the Cuban Economy and Its Unintended Consequences, 24 U. MIAMI
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 195 (2016).
113. Cave, supra note 108.
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market, people finally have a stake in the economy, which then
generates economic activity. 114
Decree-Law 288 only affects sales to citizens and permanent
residents of Cuba, so foreign individuals cannot yet buy homes on the
island. 115 However, Raul Castro’s reforms have opened up possible
future opportunities for foreign property ownership in Cuba. The
National Assembly passed Decree-Law 273 in 2010 to promote “the
participation of foreign investment in international tourism.” 116 This
allowed for foreign corporations to enter the country and build up
resorts, golf courses, and real-estate developments. 117 It grants the
businesses “surface rights,” meaning that a business can improve and
use a piece of land but the state retains ownership of the land itself.118
In 2012, Cuba reformed its migration and travel laws, allowing for
foreign visitors who are “residents of real estate developments.” 119 So
while there is no direct provision for foreign citizens to purchase housing
in Cuba, there are manners for which people can own and rent homes
in housing developments, staying in the country for one-year
increments. 120
Allowing for home ownership created a housing market in Cuba,
fostering a free-market economy. 121 Foreign investment and ownership
has also served as a boost to the economy. 122 Even though the market
is still heavily controlled by the government under these policies, it
begins to show a movement away from Socialism. These changes allow
for greater personal economic rights and freedoms, a trend that has
continued in recent years.
C.

Constitutional Recognition of Private Property

Consistent with the continued expansion of economic freedoms in
Cuba, the new Cuban Constitution greatly expands on constitutionally
114. Id.
115. Peters, supra note 21, at 15.
116. Id. at 16.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 17.
120. Id.
121. Jill Hamberg, Cuba Opens to Private Housing but Preserves Housing
http://www.reimaginerpe.org/node/6930
Rights,
REIMAGINE,
[https://perma.cc/MUW8-TAGH]
122. See Mimi Whitefield, Foreign Investment in Cuba Might be at Risk if U.S.
Allows Lawsuits over Confiscated Property, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 20,
2019),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/cuba/article221222875.html
[https://perma.cc/Y4GZ-29YH].
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granted property rights. 123 The property provisions in the Constitution
show a desire to abide with socialist economic principles while also
creating avenues that foster economic growth in capitalist systems.
The new Cuban Constitution defines seven different types of
property ownership: “socialist of all the people,” cooperative, mixed,
“of the political, mass and social organizations,” “of institutions and
associative forms,” private, and personal. 124 All of these ownership types
are founded on socialist policies and communal ownership, except for
private and personal ownership. Personal ownership is defined as
“exercised over the assets which, without constituting means of
production, contribute to the satisfaction of the material and spiritual
necessities of their holder.” 125 And private ownership is defined as
“exercised over certain means of production, in accordance with what
is established.” 126 The final version of the Constitution also emphasized
that private property only serves a complementary role in the socialist
economy. 127
Even though the definition of private property in Article 22 does
not reference land ownership, 128 Article 29 clearly establishes privateland ownership to be “regulated by a special regime.” 129 The state places
further restrictions on private-land ownership, limiting property
transfers to the scope of the laws already established. 130 It additionally
prohibits any act that would serve as a cession of your individual rights
in the property (e.g. leasing, share-cropping, mortgage lending, etc.).131
Even though the Constitution recognizes these private rights of
ownership, it also places limitations on property rights and allows the
state to retain ultimate control. 132 In the next couple years, the National
Assembly will likely enact further laws that solidify the scope of these
property rights. But if the property rights are further limited, these
123. Compare Constitución de la República [Constitution] Apr. 10, 2019
(Cuba), translated in CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA (Maria
del Carmen Gress, trans., HeinOnline World Constitutions Illustrated
Library 2019) [hereinafter 2019 Constitution], with 1976 Constitution,
supra note 104.
124. 2019 Constitution, supra note 123, art. 22.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. art. 29.
130. 2019 Constitution, supra note 123, art. 29.
131. Id.
132. Id. art. 30.
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freedoms will be constricted to a point that won’t allow for significant
economic growth.

IV.
A.

PROPERTY OWNERSHIP

Traditional Forms of Property Ownership

Property ownership is typically divided into two major categories:
private property and public property. 133 Public property is simply
property owned by the state. 134 In capitalist systems, public property
often includes things like parks, highways, and streetlamps. 135 They are
items owned and controlled by the state and serve for the public benefit
of all. 136 Because no individual would expend the cost and energy to
maintain a good that he has no individual right in, the government
owns and controls these goods. 137 Public property is a bit more allencompassing in socialist systems, where virtually everything is a public
good since everything is owned by the state. 138 Means of production and
flow of capital are completely under the state’s control. 139 Theoretical
Socialism concentrates ownership in the community rather than a state
entity. 140 Instead of the traditional state-owned public property,
socialist societies have a more fluid concept of communal property and
social ownership. 141
Private property is a bit more nebulous of a concept. Generally, it
is considered the ownership of property by non-governmental legal

133. See John W. Allen, Private Rights to Property: Private Versus Public
BUS.
SCH.,
Property
Rights,
MAYS
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134. See id.
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TRIBUNE (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.startribune.com/democraticsocialism-we-re-already-living-it/334832861/
[https://perma.cc/7LPNT549] (discussing public infrastructure as aspects of capitalist systems).
136. See generally id.
137. See Allen, supra note 133.
(Jun.
25,
138. Will
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https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/socialism.asp
[https://perma.cc/UED5-3AF8] [hereinafter Kenton, Socialism].

2019),
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entities. 142 It is typically divided into three categories: personal
property, real property, and capital goods. Personal property includes
an individual’s possessions that were gained in a socially fair manner.143
This can include clothing, cars, furniture, computers, and any other
items acquired for personal use. Real property is typically defined as
land and any structures on it. 144 And capital goods include capital
(money) and means of production. 145
1.

Private Property in Capitalist Systems

Capitalist systems often approach private property with a “bundle
of sticks” theory of ownership. 146 This asserts that property rights can
be given and taken away in parts or in the entirety. 147 The owner has
absolute control over their property and the rights of ownership in the
property. 148 Capitalist systems discourage government involvement in
property ownership because it takes away from the number of “sticks”
that the owner should have with legal ownership of property. 149 The
greater amount of rights that the government asserts over a piece of
property, the fewer rights the owner has left to enjoy. 150
Capitalist systems are not only founded on the recognition of
private-property rights, but also the legal protection of them. 151 When
someone infringes on an individual’s ability to fully enjoy their property
142. CAMPBELL MCCONNELL ET AL., ECONOMICS, at G-22 (McGraw-Hill, 18th
ed. 2008).
143. See LEGAL ASPECTS OF PROPERTY, ESTATE PLANNING, AND INSURANCE
363 (2012), available at https://2012books.lardbucket.org/pdfs/legalaspects-of-property-estate-planning-and-insurance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/52H6-V59B].
144. Objects, Subjects, And Types of Possessory Interests in Property,
BRITANNICA,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
https://www.britannica.com/topic/property-law/Objects-subjects-andtypes-of-possessory-interests-in-property
[https://perma.cc/8TDE83MH].
145. Kimberly Amadeo, Capital Goods with Examples and their Effect on the
Economy, THE BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/capital-goodsexamples-effect-on-economy-3306224 [https://perma.cc/P3Q8-GEEG].
146. See Property Rights as a Bundle of Sticks, THE THUGOUT (Sept. 23, 2009),
https://thugout.wordpress.com/2009/09/23/property-rights-as-a-bundleof-sticks/ [https://perma.cc/7JB5-NUJP].
147. Id.
148. Will
Kenton,
Capitalism,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitalism.asp
[https://perma.cc/EN75-UFGL] [hereinafter Kenton, Capitalism].
149. See generally id.
150. See Property Rights as a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 146.
151. Kenton, Capitalism, supra note 148.
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rights, there is often a legal remedy for that wrong. 152 Thus, capitalist
countries require a developed court system to support the enforcement
of private property rights. 153
In a capitalist system, private-property ownership boosts economic
activity, encouraging the buying and selling of goods and creating a
flow of capital into the market. 154 Private ownership provides incentives
for private owners to invest in their property and make it more
productive and valuable because they will reap the benefits of doing
so. 155 For example, by investing in a house, the owner increases the
house’s value; the incentive to invest comes from that value. When an
owner then sells that house, the increased value of the house goes to
the owner and the wealth generated by the increased value can then be
used to purchase and invest in other property. The incentive to invest
in property is what leads to economic growth. 156 On the other hand, if
there are restrictions on what you can do with property, then that
incentive is diminished. 157 A large tax on the increased value of property
reduces the incentive to invest in it. A ban on sales or a forced sale to
the state removes the incentive even more. The potential of private
property to lead to growth depends on how and what kind of
restrictions the state puts on property.
2.

Private Property in Socialist Systems

Socialist systems often don’t recognize private property, since all
ownership rights are held by either the government or community.158
Traditional understandings of Socialism show a rejection of all private
property, and people typically assume this means that you do not have
ownership rights in anything. 159 But socialist regimes often let citizens
retain control over personal property, like your toothbrush or cell
152. Id.
153. See Sean Ross, What Role Does the Government Play in Capitalism,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040615/what-role-doesgovernment-play-capitalism.asp [https://perma.cc/62S7-H2SF].
154. See Benjamin Powell, Private Property Rights, Economic Freedom, and
CTR.,
Wellbeing,
MERCATUS
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Private-Property-RightsEconomic-Freedom-and-Well-Being.pdf [https://perma.cc/G363-H3BH].
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Kenton, Socialism, supra note 138.
159. Steven Keehner, Let’s Clear the Air About Socialism, IMPACT NEWS (Oct.
11, 2018), https://theimpactnews.com/columnists/tales-of-an-americanredhead/2018/10/11/lets-clear-the-air-about-socialism/
[https://perma.cc/TB3A-U478].
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phone. 160 It is the private property that Socialism seeks to abolish.
Socialist theorists define private property as anything used by
individuals to create profit from someone else. 161 This does complicate
certain pieces of property, such as homes and real estate, where they
can be used for personal enjoyment as well as profit. Consequently,
some of these aspects of Socialism are applied differently depending on
the country. Additionally, socialist countries do not have legal systems
designed to protect private-property rights because there is no need for
this protection. 162
B.

Cuba’s Constitutionally Recognized Forms of Property Ownership

Cuba’s new Constitution recognizes seven different forms of
property ownership. 163 The first defined form of ownership is “socialist
of all the people.” 164 This is described as property ownership where the
state owns the property and acts in representation of and to its
benefit. 165 This is the typical state-owned property you would expect to
see in a socialist system. The second type of ownership is “cooperative,”
meaning it is collectively owned by multiple proprietary partners and
sustained on collective work and the principles of cooperation. 166 In this
context, cooperative ownership is used in the workplace, serving as a
small-scale socialist environment. 167 Consistent with the renovation
Cuba is going through, we see the devolving of state power downwards
to lower levels of government and cooperatives. 168 Third is ownership
“of the political, mass, and social organizations.” 169 Just as it sounds,
this property ownership is exercised by these entities over their assets.170
The most obvious example of this in Cuba is the property owned by
the Communist Party. While separate from state-owned property, these

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Kenton, Socialism, supra note 138.
163. 2019 Constitution, supra note 123, art. 22.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Cliff DuRand, Cooperatives in Socialist Construction, GRASSROOTS ECON.
ORGANIZING (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.geo.coop/story/cooperativessocialist-construction [https://perma.cc/96XA-BPQJ].
168. Id.
169. 2019 Constitution, supra note 123, art. 22.
170. Id.
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social organizations are largely interconnected with the government.171
The fourth type of ownership is “of institutions and associative forms,”
which provides for ownership over an entity’s assets that are not being
used to produce revenue. 172 This would include property owned by
organizations like non-profits or community groups, as long as the
assets are used “for the fulfillment of purposes of a non-lucrative
character.” 173
Diverging from more socialist forms of ownership, the fifth type
recognized is “personal” property ownership. 174 This ownership is
consistent with the normal understanding of personal property. It is the
things you own to satisfy material and spiritual necessities, and it does
not include any means of production. 175 The sixth—and most
important—type of ownership is “private” ownership. 176 Article 22
defines private-property ownership as ownership over the means of
production, “in accordance with what is established.” 177 The final
version of the Constitution also emphasized that private property only
serves a complementary role in the socialist economy. 178 Although this
seems like a narrow definition, Article 29 does recognize private
ownership of land. 179 This is a huge divergence from past practices in
Cuba. This constitutional provision builds on the 2011 statute that
allowed for home ownership, 180 taking a monumental stride forward by
formally recognizing private property ownership in the Constitution for
the first time since 1959. 181 The last type of property ownership is
“mixed,” meaning that it is a combination of two or more forms of
ownership. 182
Most of these forms of property ownership seek to advance the
socialist goals of the government, but private property is where we see

171. See generally Communist Party of Cuba, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Communist-Party-of-Cuba
[https://perma.cc/QEW2-KXFG].
172. 2019 Constitution, supra note 123, art. 22.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 2019 Constitution, supra note 123, art. 22.
179. Id. art. 29.
180. See generally Cave, supra note 108.
181. See Ortiz, supra note 90, at 322.
182. 2019 Constitution, supra note 123, art. 22.
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a divergence. 183 Normal socialist systems try not to recognize privateproperty ownership. 184 While it seems that Cuba is trying to encourage
economic growth by allowing for privatization in some sectors, it is
currently unclear how they plan to recognize these rights while
maintaining a socialist government and economy. If Cuba wishes to
avoid some of the problems post-communist countries experience with
privatization, the Cuban government should look to countries who have
gone through this transition before.

V.

Theories Concerning the Intersection of Private
Property Rights Economic Growth

Over the past few decades, political scientists and economists have
started to realize the important relationship between property rights
and economic growth. 185 Initially, political scientists focused on the type
of political reforms countries were instituting, but over the years, legal
recognition and protection of property rights have proven to be vital
components for economic growth. 186 This section will first look at how
post-communist countries have gone through privatization processes to
stimulate economic growth since they abandoned their communist
regimes. These countries and theories provide insight into the transition
Cuba has been going through since the end of Fidel Castro’s regime.
The second section will look at the important role that private property
rights play in Latin American economies, since Latin America
experiences a unique blend of economic circumstances that often make
it difficult for capitalist economic policies to take root. 187 Looking at the
application of private-property rights across these different systems will
give Cuba the best understanding of what methods of privatization lead
to the most economic growth.
A.

Privatization in Post-Communist Countries

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, twenty-nine countries in
Central and Eastern Europe were given the opportunity to reinvent

183. Frank, supra note 53.
184. Kenton, Socialism, supra note 138.
185. Gerald P. O’Driscoll Jr. & W. Lee Hoskins, Property Rights: The Key to
INST.
(Aug.
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2003),
Economic
Development,
CATO
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/property-rights-keyeconomic-development [https://perma.cc/K6SZ-DGKC].
186. See generally Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the PostCommunist Economies, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (1994).
187. See generally

DE
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their institutional frameworks. 188 They implemented a variety of
economic and political reforms to structure their countries, with varying
degrees of success. 189 These post-Soviet countries have served as
excellent examples of countries who have implemented property-rights
reforms in the transition from a socialist, state-planned economy to a
capitalist, market economy. 190
1.

Constitutional Provisions Protecting Property Rights

Every post-Soviet country either wrote a new Constitution or
reinstated a modified version of the Constitution that was in place
before they were absorbed into the Soviet Union. 191 Sixteen of these
countries implemented Constitutions that had clear protections of
property rights, though each country also placed some sort of limitation
on the right to private property. 192 The property-rights provisions were
typically vague, leaving the government with significant power to
handle property ownership how they wished. 193 These flexible provisions
undermined the legal right to property ownership. 194 If the scope of legal
recognition and protection of property rights can be controlled by
political choices, these limitations counteract any benefit of the
constitutional protection of property rights. 195
After the fall of the Soviet Union, countries like Estonia, Moldova,
and Ukraine, provided very strong constitutional provisions protecting
property rights, but also limited the use of private property. 196 While
some countries fall in the middle with weaker constitutional provisions
on property rights, 197 the Czech Republic is at the opposite end of the
188. Christian Bjørnskov, Constitutional Property Rights Protection and
Economic Growth: Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition, RATIO
INST., at 6 (Mar. 16, 2012).
189. See id. at 6–7.
190. While this paper recognizes that other communist countries bear
significant resemblances to Cuba, they have fundamental differences that
would render comparisons irrelevant. China is an excellent example of a
county who has adopted capitalist economic policies but still has a
political system controlled by the communist party. But China also enjoys
the second-largest population in the world, a mass amount of resources,
and healthy foreign investment. Cuba does not have the population or
resources to undergo the mass industrialization that China did.
191. Bjørnskov, supra note 188, at 6.
192. Id. at 20.
193. Id. at 20–21.
194. Id. at 21.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 7.
197. Bjørnskov, supra note 188, at 7.
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spectrum with a constitution that does not even mention private
ownership or property rights. 198 The Czech Republic does recognize
private-property rights, just not through their Constitution; private
property is protected by statutes and judicial norms. 199 Despite the lack
of constitutional provisions protecting private property, the Czech
Republic has some of the highest levels of property rights protection
and has experienced one of the largest rates of economic growth since
the fall of the Soviet Union. 200
In contrast, Ukraine, whose Constitution has strong protections of
property, 201 remains one of the poorer countries in Europe with higher
levels of inequality than other post-communist countries. 202 There are
several theories for why Ukraine’s constitutional property protections
did not lead to economic growth. It might be because the governmental
restrictions placed on property rights undermined the grant of legal
protection. It might be because Ukraine’s gradual reformation process203
did not put necessary institutions in place quickly and early-on to
establish a system of property ownership. It might be because Ukraine
formally recognized private-property rights without building up
informal structures to enforce societal recognition of these rights and
protect them at a local level. While constitutions are an important tool
for laying out the framework of a country, constitutional recognition of
property rights without complementary reforms in other sectors will
not lead to economic growth.
2.

Formal Versus Informal Recognition of Private Property Rights

Post-communist countries can make as many large-scale,
constitutional property-rights reforms as they wish, but some
economists theorize that economic growth will not occur until there is
change in the community, local courts, and civil society. 204 Formal
198. See ÚSTAVA ZÁKON Č. [CONSTITUTION], Jan. 1993 Sb., (Czech Republic),
translated in English translation of Constitution of the Czech Republic of
6 December 1992, 1/1993 Sb., as amended to Constitutional Act 98/2013
Sb. [1] (1993).
199. Bjørnskov, supra note 188, at 7.
200. Id. at 7–8.
201. Id. at 7.
202. Aleksander Kuczabski & Tomasz Michalski, Ukrainian Post-Communist
Transformation: Causes, Consequences and Threats, 33 QUAESTIONES
GEOGRAPHICAE 171 (2014).
203. Marian Tupy, Countries That Transitioned Rapidly from Communism to
(July
19,
2016),
Capitalism
Fare
Better,
REASON
http://reason.com/archives/2016/07/19/countries-that-transitionedrapidly-from [https://perma.cc/854C-H778].
204. See generally Javad Bahmani, The Role of Civil Society in Development,
5 J. CIVIL LEGAL SCI. 1 (2016).
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institutions include rules that show depth and durability, such as
constitutions or democratically-enacted laws. 205 On the other hand,
informal institutions are rules that shape human behavior, but are
outside of government control. 206 In its most simplified form, informal
institutions are the culture of a country. 207 Informal institutions include
private mechanisms that exist to protect and secure property. 208
Legislatures can adopt formal civil codes to force a new legal system
in a country. 209 But a more favored route is allowing the common-law
process to gradually recognize private-property rights and build a legal
framework for protecting those rights while the political system
stabilizes. 210 Studies have shown that culture positively affects property
protection, while formal institutions have no impact on the level of
property protection in countries. 211 Informal institutions might be the
primary mechanism for securing private property protection in postsocialist countries. 212 Granted, this does not render formal institutions
invalid, as formal-institution reforms are often aimed to bring changes
to informal institutions. 213 But there will be little economic growth
flowing from the protection of private-property rights unless there are
societal shifts and reforms that accompany large-scale policy changes.
As seen in the Czech Republic, formal constitutional provisions are
not necessary to benefit from the economic growth that privateproperty rights can bring. 214 But because they had political, civil, and
legal reforms that accompanied economic reforms, 215 there was a
balance between the formal recognition of private property and the
informal protection and enforcement of it on a local and practical scale.
The protection of private-property rights through informal institutions
is essential to economic growth is post-socialist countries.

205. Claudia R. Williamson & Carrie B. Kerekes, Securing Private Property:
Formal versus Informal Institutions, 54 J. OF L. & ECON. 537, 545 (2011).
206. Id. at 546.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. Rubin, supra note 186, at 9 (stating that there are two major methods
deriving the law governing private relations, one of which is the adoption
of formal civil codes through legislation).
210. See id. at 10.
211. Williamson & Kerekes, supra note 205, at 559.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 553.
214. See Bjørnskov, supra note 188, at 7.
215. See Tupy, supra note 203.
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3.

Speed of Reforms

A recent study has shown that the speed of transition also plays a
significant role in post-communist countries. 216 Former Soviet countries
who have undergone a process of rapidly adopting capitalist economic
regimes have fared better over the past 25 years. 217 While the beginning
of the transition is often chaotic and leads to an increased risk of
corruption, countries who transitioned rapidly have grown richer and
more democratic, while experiencing less impoverishment and a smaller
increase in income inequality. 218 Other countries have adopted a more
gradual approach, but they have all performed worse economically,
socially, and democratically. 219 Unfortunately, there is this
misperception that rapid reform leads to severe human suffering, and
even though rapid transitions are difficult at the beginning, they prove
more beneficial over time. 220
When initial reforms occur, there also need to be structures in place
to accommodate those reforms. 221 If large-scale recognitions of property
rights do not occur alongside the development of institutional methods
for protecting those rights, the economic market will not benefit from
private-property ownership.
The Czech Republic is unique in that it initiated several policies up
front and sustained them over time. 222 Their reforms focused on the
creation of democratic political institutions and processes, the
transformation of state-planned economies into market economies, the
gradual introduction of the rule of law, and the growth of a civil
society. 223 These reforms shaped everything from local recognition of
property rights to statutory protection of private property. 224

216. Oleh Havrylyshyn et al., 25 Years of Reforms in Ex-Communist
Countries: Fast and Extensive Reforms Led to Higher Growth and More
INST.
(Jul.
12,
2016),
Political
Freedom,
CATO
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/25-years-reforms-excommunist-countries-fast-extensive-reforms-led [https://perma.cc/KD339LCN].
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Williamson & Kerekes, supra note 205, at 559.
222. Tupy, supra note 203.
223. See id.
224. See generally THE SCOPE
Rivera ed., 2013).
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Alternatively, Russia continued to enforce socialist policies in their
country for decades after the fall of the Soviet Union. 225 Instead of
rapidly reforming, Russia adopted several reforms early on, but then
abandoned or reversed some of those reforms. 226 By 1998, Russia faced
economic collapse. 227 Ukraine has gone through an even slower reform
process, stretching out its gradual changes over the past 25 years.228
Ukraine’s initial constitutional recognition of property rights was not
quickly followed by the establishment of institutions to protect those
rights, so the economy did not benefit from the creation of that right.
It is important to note that other prominent theorists argue that
the creation of a market economy does not need to be done quickly.229
Gradually privatizing and creating market institutions could avoid a
political backlash against reformers, leading to less pain in the short
run and greater stability and economic growth in the long run.230
Slovenia serves as an example of a country who privatized more
gradually yet achieved sustainable economic growth. 231 Because
observing the speed of reforms alone can lead to varying results, it is
important to look at the rate of reform alongside the manner that
reforms were carried out.
4.

Methods of Privatization

Post-Soviet countries went through different processes of
privatizing previously state-owned property. 232 State-owned enterprises
(SOE’s) are distinct legal entities that are owned by the government
and engage in commercial, industrial, or financial activities involving
the production and sale of economic goods or services; 233 SOE’s are
225. Tupy, supra note 203.
226. See Anders Aslund, Why has Russia’s Economic Transformation Been
So Arduous?, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, (Apr. 28, 1999),
https://carnegieendowment.org/1999/04/28/why-has-russia-s-economictransformation-been-so-arduous-pub-201
[https://perma.cc/XW8W9Q2P].
227. Abbigail J. Chiodo & Michael T. Owyang, A Case Study of a Currency
Crisis: The Russian Default of 1998, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 7
(2002),
https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/02/11/Chio
doOwyang.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z83A-CTYL].
228. Kuczabski & Michalski, supra note 202.
229. Simeon Djankov, The Divergent Postcommunist Paths to Democracy and
Economic Freedom, Discussion Paper No. 758, at 3 (Peterson Inst. for
Int’l Econ., Jul. 2016).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Savas, supra note 10, at 573.
233. Id.
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fundamental to socialist systems. 234 In Soviet countries, SOE’s
comprised roughly 85% of the economy, as compared to capitalist
countries where SOE’s make up about 9% of the economy. 235 When
post-socialist countries decide to transition to a capitalist economic
system, they have to decrease the number and involvement of SOE’s in
their economy. This process is typically done through privatization of
state-owned assets. 236
Privatization can occur through three different methods: (1)
divestment; (2) displacement; and (3) delegation. 237 Divestment means
removing an asset or enterprise by selling it, giving it away, or
liquidating it. 238 Displacement is a more passive process where state
involvement gradually dissipates, and markets develop to satisfy needs
that SOE’s are no longer fulfilling. 239 Displacement can either occur
through default—where the public finds that government provisions are
inadequate and fill the gap—or through withdrawal—where the
government shuts down a failing enterprise. 240 The last method of
privatization is delegation, where the government delegates the activity
of producing goods or services to the private sector but retains the
responsibility of overseeing the result. 241 Delegation often serves as an
intermediate step before divestment. 242
Unfortunately, the process of privatization in post-socialist
countries faces several hurdles. Janusz Lewandowski, Poland’s Minister
for Ownership Changes, summarized the difficulties post-socialist
countries face, stating that, “privatization is the sale of enterprises that
no one owns, and whose value no one knows, to buyers who have no
money.” 243 One hurdle is determining ownership of this property.244
Many of the state-owned assets being privatized once belonged to
citizens before they were expropriated. 245 New post-socialist states must
determine how and if they choose to recognize old ownership rights and
234. Kenton, Socialism, supra note 138.
235. Savas, supra note 10, at 574.
236. See id. at 573.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 574.
239. See id. at 575.
240. Id.
241. Savas, supra note 10, at 576.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 577.
245. Frances H. Foster, Restitution of Expropriated Property: Post-Soviet
Lessons for Cuba, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 621, 627 (1996).
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award restitution for being deprived of property. 246 Next, they must
determine the value of and sell SOE’s. 247 Because there was no market
for these enterprises before, there is no guide for how these assets should
be valued. 248 And then the state is trying to sell them to a population
that doesn’t have the wealth or economic capacity to purchase assets.249
Poland, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, and Romania
attempted to remedy these problems through the free transfer of shares
in SOE’s to all citizens. 250 This process was fair, easy, quick, and
accessible to citizens who did not have capital to purchase assets. 251 On
the other hand, these shares were viewed as gifts instead of investment
opportunities and often did not lead to the formation and growth of a
market economy. 252
Other post-Soviet countries have taken a decentralized approach to
privatization. 253 Instead of mass, nation-wide privatization, countries
like Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic implemented
administrative avenues for privatization of SOE’s. 254 Plans for
privatization of business could be submitted to agencies, who looked
over the plans for privatizing and helped establish a business that will
contribute to the economy. 255
Privatization in post-socialist countries is a difficult process, but a
few former-Soviet countries have undergone successful privatization
processes and are now experiencing economic growth in a market
economy.
5.

Legal Systems and Property Rights

Once private-property rights are granted and citizens possess
property, there needs to be a mechanism to protect these property
interests. Court systems are fundamental to support the recognition
and protection of private-property rights in post-socialist countries. 256

246. See id.
247. Savas, supra note 10, at 578.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See id.
252. Id.
253. Savas, supra note 10, at 579.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See generally The Fundamental Right to Use One’s Own Property,
INST.,
https://libertasutah.org/policy-papers/propertyLIBERTAS
rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKW9-CYEA].
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Most post-communist countries base their legal systems on civil
codes instead of common-law rulings by judges. 257 The lawyers and
policymakers who draft civil codes must have knowledge of both local
conditions and capitalist legal theories of property rights.258
Policymakers won’t have an adequate grasp on what laws are needed
to adequately protect and encourage private-property ownership until
after capitalist ownership policies have been implemented. 259 Thus,
judges and courts serve this function of enforcing property-right
protections, acting after initial policies have been implemented. Courts
make decisions about the day-to-day functions of property rights that
arise out of the dispute-resolution process. 260
National legislatures can enact civil codes to govern property rights,
but they will be the most successful when they work with the judicial
system to bring property-right protection through a common-law
system. 261 Court systems define the local, informal institutions that are
so vital to protecting property rights and encouraging economic growth.
Each of the factors previously discussed, and many more, play a role in
determining how to best implement private property rights in order to
facilitate economic growth. But the struggles facing post-socialist
countries are not the only factors Cuban policymakers must take into
consideration.
B.

Private Property Rights in Latin American Countries

Latin America is comprised of states that experience the highest
rates of wealth inequality, low development rates, and fluctuating
GDP’s that fall well below developed countries. 262 Cuba shares these
unique characteristics of Latin American countries, further
complicating Cuba’s road to post-socialist economic growth.
Economists theorize that the key to economic development in Latin
America lies in the recognition and protection of private-property
rights. 263

257. Rubin, supra note 186, at 9.
258. Id. at 10.
259. See id.
260. Id.
261. See id.
262. High Levels of Inequality in Latin America Constitute an Obstacle to
Sustainable Development, ECON. COMM’N FOR LATIN AM. AND THE
CARIBBEAN
(May
30,
2017),
https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/eclac-high-levels-inequalitylatin-america-constitute-obstacle-sustainable-development
[https://perma.cc/AS8T-NF93].
263. See generally,
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1.

Inability to Produce Capital

Many people are led to believe that the citizens of Third World
countries are oppressed beggars, trapped in obsolete practices. 264 But
this is far from the case. Latin American countries are overflowing with
entrepreneurs that already possess the assets needed to form a
successful capitalist system. 265 The reason that the majority of the world
is not benefiting from Capitalism is that they lack the ability to produce
capital. 266
Even the poorest countries in Latin America have the assets
necessary to jump-start a capitalist market economy, but they own
these assets in defective forms. 267 Houses are built on land with
unrecorded ownership rights. 268 Entrepreneurs own unincorporated
businesses without proper liability protection. 269 Businesses and
industries are located where investors cannot be made aware of them.270
In Western countries, every parcel of land is recorded, every
business must meet legal requirements, and every enterprise has the
opportunity for investment. 271 The creation of capital in these countries
began when they established widespread, formal property law that
equipped every citizen with the ability to participate in the market
system. 272 Formal private-property rights give low-income citizens a
stake in the market system, providing an opportunity to invest in and
develop their assets. 273
Latin American countries are stuck in a cycle where they cannot
produce capital to invest in the economy because there is no formal
legal recognition of the capital they already possess.
2.

Formal Recognition of Property Rights

As a region, Latin America experiences the highest rates of income
inequality in the world. 274 By establishing formal property rights,

264. Id. at 4.
265. Id. at 4–5.
266. Id. at 5.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 5–6.
269.
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271. See id.
272. Id. at 10.
273. See generally id.
274. See generally High Levels of Inequality in Latin America Constitute an
Obstacle to Sustainable Development, supra note 262.
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governments give their citizens a stake in the economy, a means to
invest and participate. 275
Peru is one of the most economically stable Latin American
countries. 276 And their growth directly flowed out of Peru’s success in
reforming and improving their property rights. 277 Economic reforms
moved Peru’s street vendors, transportation workers, low-income
farmers, and millions of other participants in the informal sector into
the legalized economy. 278 Coupled with policy reforms—like simplifying
administrative processes, improving access to public information,
unifying business registries, and democratizing rule-making—Peru has
seen significant economic growth flowing from the recognition of
private-property rights and integration of low-income participants into
the economy. 279
Alternately, Brazil has demonstrated minimal economic growth in
the last decade, since their system does not grant full property rights.280
Brazilian law punishes owners if their property does not serve a “social
function,” which weakens the importance and value of private
property. 281 Owners are obligated to make their property productive, in
accordance with the state’s criteria. 282 In Brazil, state intervention
clearly has a negative impact on the economy, and the lack of legal
security in property rights scares investors away. 283
Many developing countries have the assets required to support a
capitalist market economy, 284 but economic growth will not occur until
property rights are formally recognized. Without a proper stake in the
economy, individuals will not invest in or develop their assets in a
manner that stimulates growth.

275. Moisés Rendón, Latin America Can Slash Poverty with Property Rights,
POST
(Mar.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CUBA

VI.

In the wake of implementing a new Constitution, the Cuban
government has a responsibility to provide further structure and
guidance for its constitutional provisions. 285 Cuba’s monumental
recognition of private-property rights will be futile without further
reforms to protect and define that right. Because of Cuba’s socialist
system and current economic predispositions, the path to sustainable
economic growth will be difficult. But, by looking at past experiences
of countries who have gone through similar processes, we can learn
about potential obstacles that Cuba might face and provide
recommendations for transitioning to an economically healthy privateproperty system.
A.

Challenges Cuba Faces

No other country in the world has been in the exact same position
Cuba is in right now. Post-Soviet countries benefited from being able
to start from scratch in building a new institutional framework.286
Whereas Cuba seems to be gradually transitioning out of an existing
political and economic system. Successful Latin American countries laid
out the framework for capitalist market economies before going through
property-rights reform. 287 Whereas Cuba is trying to imbue their
socialist economy with capitalist mechanisms for growth.
When it comes to privatization, Cuba is not seeking to relinquish
all control over the means of production. Even their Constitution still
establishes state and communally-owned property as the favored form
of ownership. 288 While there might not be the mass privatization
movement that Soviet countries experienced, 289 Cuba is undergoing
small-scale privatizations. 290 Over the last 10 years, Cuba has laid off
surplus state labor and expanded private-sector business licenses.291
While they hoped that this would help grow the private sector of the
economy, the practical and legal restrictions on market access have
strangled this opportunity for growth. 292 But these reforms occurred
before both the statutory creation of ownership rights in homes and the

285. See Rodriguez, supra note 17.
286. See Bjørnskov, supra note 188, at 7.
287. See generally
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291. Id. at 198.
292. Id. at 199.

662

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
Introducing Private-Property Rights to Cuba

constitutional recognition of private property. 293 If Cuba follows
through with reinforcing and protecting property rights, they might be
able to remedy this problem, because private-property rights give
individuals the capital to invest in the market. 294
Legalizing private property comes with a whole new set of
problems. In Cuba’s housing sector, residences have been owned by
single families for generations without proper recording, and many of
the property transfers that occurred before 2011 were illegal transfers.295
Further, the Cuban government continually fails to provide a remedy
for property expropriated under the Castro regime, especially for Cuban
exiles living abroad. 296
The systems Cuba currently has in place create property rights, but
the amount of restrictions on those rights discourages individuals from
using their assets in the market. And without market activity, Cuba
will not experience economic growth as a result of granting privateproperty rights.
B.

Problems to Avoid

Although there is no guidebook for how to successfully implement
property rights and capitalist economic reforms in a socialist country,
there are some major pitfalls that Cuba should be aware of. While Cuba
is already experiencing many of these issues, improperly stewarding the
implementation of property rights may lead to these problems
worsening. The central goal of recognizing private-property rights is to
encourage market participation and help expand the middle class. 297 If
property reforms are implemented without methods for protection or
stabilization, Cuba could face greater wealth inequality or the creation
of a plutocracy. And there is always the danger that they could regress
back to comfortable socialist economic policies.
1.

Wealth Inequality

Although we do not have data on the current level of income
inequality in Cuba, experts theorize that Cuba has one of the highest

293. Id. at 197. See also 2019 Constitution, supra note 123, art. 22.; DecretoLey 288, GACETA OFICIAL, G.O. Ext. No. 35, at 359 (Oct. 28, 2011),
accessible
at
http://cafefuerte.com/documentos/1308-documentosdecreto-ley-288-y-resoluciones-para-la-compraventa-de-casas-en-cuba/
[https://perma.cc/H9YB-UCKX].
294. See generally Palomo, supra note 112.
295. See generally Peters, supra note 21.
296. See Nicolás J. Gutiérrez Jr., The De-Constitutionalization Of Property
Rights: Castro’s Systematic Assault on Private Ownership In Cuba, 5 U.
MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51 (2015).
297. See Kenton, Capitalism, supra note 148.
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rates of economic inequality in the world. 298 Their population is divided
between the low-income working class and the wealthy political elite
(typically officials in the Communist Party). 299 There is virtually no
middle class in Cuba, and many other Latin American countries suffer
from the same problem. 300
If Cuba begins to privatize property without creating specific
provisions that welcome low-income citizens into the economy with
incentives to invest and participate, it will not experience economic
growth. The lower class will sell their assets to the upper class for shortterm gain, relinquishing the ability to participate in the market in the
future. The rich will become richer and the poor will become poorer.
Peru’s reforms were so successful because they welcomed low-income
entrepreneurs into the formal economic market. 301 The government did
not merely provide the opportunity to participate, they rewarded
investment in the market. 302 Granting private-property rights without
further provisions for effective participation in the market will lead to
higher rates of income inequality and will not serve the purpose the
reforms originally intended.
2.

Creation of a Plutocracy

Going hand-in-hand with increased economic inequality is the risk
of the creation of a plutocracy. A plutocracy is a system of government
controlled exclusively by the wealthy, either directly or indirectly.303
These systems can arise inadvertently, and many Latin American
countries trend towards this “rule by the wealthy.” 304
If Cuba enters a cycle where low-income citizens sell their assets to
the wealthy elite and fail to further participate in the economy, the
298. Audiotape: Maria Werlau, Communism in Cuba and North Korea,
Lecture given at Case Western Reserve University (Oct. 18, 2018) (on file
with author).
299. Id.
300. See George Gao, Latin America’s Middle Class Grows, But in Some
Regions More Than Others, PEW RES. CTR. (Jul. 20, 2015),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/20/latin-americasmiddle-class-grows-but-in-some-regions-more-than-others/
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wealthy are left with complete market control. Cuba’s political system
is currently controlled exclusively by the Communist Party. 305 And the
majority of Cuba’s wealth is concentrated in its Communist Party
members. 306 Without a balance in market participation, all of Cuba’s
wealth and political power would concentrate in the hands of a few
hundred individuals, most of whom have some level of political
influence.
While it may seem like Cuba already has this system in place, their
current policies at least recognize the struggles of the lower class and
seek to remedy the distance between the working class and political
elite. The formation of a plutocracy would lead to the elimination of
the lower class’s involvement in the economy. 307 And sustainable
economic growth is not possible without widespread participation in
the market economy.
3.

Regression to Socialist Policies

Cuba took a bold step towards capitalist economic principles in
their new Constitution. But even the differences between the first draft
of the constitution and the ratified version showed Cuba was shrinking
away from their initial trajectory. 308 While socialist economic policies in
Cuba have not been successful, they are familiar. If their attempts at
capitalist reforms do not lead to economic growth in Cuba, the
government may choose to return to its socialist roots.
Russia underwent a very similar pattern, making several economic
reforms up front, but then returning to some of their socialist
principles. 309 This regression made it incredibly difficult for Russia to
establish a market economy and promote economic growth. 310 If Cuba
backtracked on economic reforms, it would only lengthen the process
and impose greater burdens on the economy. Continual reforms might
create unpredictability in the short-term, but it will lead to growth and
stability over time.
C.

How to Best Facilitate Growth

If Cuba seeks to benefit from the work it has already done with
recognizing private-property rights and attempting to build new sectors
305. Communist
Party
of
Cuba,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Communist-Party-of-Cuba
[https://perma.cc/2N8W-VGAM].
306. Audiotape: Maria Werlau, Communism in Cuba and North Korea,
Lecture given at Case Western Reserve University (Oct. 18, 2018) (on file
with author).
307. Kenton, Plutocracy, supra note 303.
308. Acosta & Marsh, supra note 75.
309. Tupy, supra note 203.
310. Id.
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of the economy to facilitate growth, the reforms cannot stop here. In
the past, Cuba has tried to encourage economic participation without
providing the assets to effectively invest and grow in the market.311
Now, Cuba is granting rights to establish those assets, but has yet to
implement any further framework for protection or implementation of
those rights. In order for Cuba to experience economic growth from
formally recognizing private-property rights, the government will need
to quickly enact laws and establish informal institutions to protect
those rights and encourage their use in the market.
1.

Amend Laws to Reinforce Private Property Rights

Constitutional recognition of private-property rights is an
important tool to provide guidance for economic growth. But as seen
in Ukraine, formal recognition alone is not enough to protect property
rights in a manner that will encourage growth. 312 If Cuba wants to
benefit from the allowance of private property, it should accompany its
constitutional provisions with laws that establish a framework for
protecting and enforcing private-property rights.
Private property is not part of the society in Cuba, and societal
change is necessary for the protection and recognition of privateproperty rights. 313 While the government cannot require people to
change their opinions, they can implement policies that lead to
transformations in informal institutions. By strengthening property
rights through small-scale provisions and local reforms, the state can
reinforce the importance of private property so that it eventually
becomes a recognized value in society.
Cuba needs to create a framework that supports and protects
private-property rights. At the same time, Cuba needs to decrease
restrictions on property ownership and use, since limitations on
property use disincentivize activity in the market. 314 Once Cuba
expands protections and decreases limitations on property rights,
citizens will have the incentive to invest their assets in the market,
leading to economic growth.
2.

Expand Economic Policies that Promote Privately-Owned
Enterprises

While individual property rights are a decent starting point,
significant economic growth will arise from the development of
privately-owned
businesses
and
the
encouragement
of
311. See Palomo, supra note 290, at 200.
312. See Bjørnskov, supra note 188, at 7–8.
313. See Williamson & Kerekes, supra note 205, at 559 (insinuating that
countries—like Cuba—who implement this system are in need of societal
reformation).
314. Powell, supra note 154, at 2.
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entrepreneurship. 315 Recent developments in business regulation have
been all over the board in Cuba, but the most recent set of reforms
severely limit business owners’ ability to effectively participate in the
market. 316
Peru experienced economic growth by formally recognizing informal
business operations. 317 The Czech Republic underwent a successful
process of privatization by legitimizing small, private business
operations that had previously been under state control. 318 Granting
businesses greater freedoms encourages economic growth. Even if
individuals have the legally protected assets to invest in the market,
they will not get involved in the market if the government’s limitations
on property place high burdens on economic participation. In order to
foster economic growth propelled by privately-owned businesses, the
Cuban government should decrease the amount of restrictions it places
on these business enterprises.
3.

Develop a Legal System that Protects Private Property Rights

Cuba’s current court system does not afford any protection for
property rights because under the socialist system, there was no need
to protect private property. 319
Cuba typically relies on civil codes for guidance on how the courts
should rule and operate. 320 But courts are one of the most important
institutions in effecting societal change. Legislatures can make decisions
at the national level, but it is the court’s application of laws that will
impact the everyday lives of citizens. 321 Cuba should approach propertyrights protections through the use of common law rulings.
Legal protection of private property and recognition of those rights
in Cuba’s courts of law will provide citizens with the assurance and
incentive to use their assets in the market. When property rights receive
legal protection, economic growth follows. 322 If Cuban courts can
successfully establish the protection of private-property rights through
common-law rulings, Cuba will be one step closer to economic growth.

Conclusion
Cuba’s new Constitution formally recognizes private property as a
form of ownership, setting the stage for economic growth and
315. Id.
316. Palomo, supra note 290, at 199.
317. Rendón, supra note 276.
318. Savas, supra note 10, at 579–80.
319. See Kenton, Socialism, supra note 138.
320. Rubin, supra note 186, at 9.
321. See id. at 10.
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participation in a capitalist market system. However, constitutional
recognition of property rights alone will not bring the growth Cuba is
seeking. In order for Cuba to benefit from the economic growth that
private-property rights bring to capitalist systems, Cuba should: (1)
implement policies that create a framework for the protection and
societal recognition of property rights; (2) reduce restrictions on how
individuals and business use their privately-owned assets in the market;
and (3) develop a legal system that safeguards private-property rights.
Cuba is in a unique position to bring about economic growth in their
nation. They have made the first step of recognizing private-property
rights. But we will have to wait and see what the future holds for Cuba.
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